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In contrast, Mr. Newkirk presented a
psychiatrist who testified that in the best
interest of the children, they should be
placed in the custody of their father. It was
the psychiatrist's opinion that it was
natural for the teenagers to prefer living
with perek, who is closer to their age,
than with a parent of a different generation. He also stated that the children felt
bound to fulfill their mother's wish for
Derek to take care of them. Newkirk, at
595, 535 A.2d at 950.
In awarding the children to Derek,
Chancellor Levin considered the reports
presented to the court and additionally indicated that he feared the estranged relationship that developed between Mr.
Newkirk and his adopted sons would
repeat itself if the father was given the custody of J ames and Meghan. The chancellor
also gave sufficient weight to the children's
desires to live with Derek. Md. Fam. Law
Code Ann. § 9-102 (1984) and Md. Est. &
Trusts Code Ann. § 13-702 (1974) allow
minors, who have attained the ages of 16
and 14 respectively, to petition for or designate their prefered guardians. Newkirk at
595, 535 A.2d at 950-51.
Reviewing this decision, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland could not
conclude that the chancellor was clearly erroneous in his findings nor that he abused
his judicial discretion in giving Derek custody of the children.
The Appellant next contended that the
chancellor erred in admitting into evidence evaluative reports by the Juvenile
Services Administration and the circuit
court's Mental Hygiene Consultation
Service. Mr. Newkirk alleged that "the
children never waived their respective
privileges (of non-disclosure) nor were
they advised of the existence thereof." Id.
at 596, 535 A.2d at 951. The court, again,
found no merit to this contention.
Both reports were ordered by officers of
the court to aid in evaluating the emotional stability of the children, as well as
the capacity of the two litigants to provide
for James and Meghan. The court further
indicated that the Appellant failed to raise
this issue below and therefore, it had been
waived under Md. Rule 1085.
Richard Newkirk's final averment was
that there was no basis in fact or in law for
the judgment entered against him for
retroactive child support and continued
weekly support payments. Id. The court of
special appeals held that by an order effective prior to Patricia Newkirk's death,
Richard Newkirk had a continuing obligation to provide for the support of his
children until modification of the order,
and that the judgment for arrearages was
proper.

The decision handed down by the Court
of Special Apeals of Maryland in Newkirk
makes it clear that the presumption that a
biological parent is always the best custodian of a child can be rebutted. The courts
must thoroughly evaluate each custody
dispute situation if the best interests of
children are to be served. This important
evaluative process attempts to ensure that
Maryland's minors have a person at home
who has the capacity, as well as desire, to
care for them.

-Jonathan

c. Levy

Campbell v. Montgomery County Bd. of

Educ.: FEMALE MINOR DOES NOT
ASSUME RISK OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT WHEN IMPERMISSIBLY
ENTERING BOYS' LOCKER ROOM
In Campbell 'V. ltlontgomery County
Board of Education, 73 Md. App. 54, 533
A.2d 9 (1987), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recently held that a
junior high school student did not assume
the risk of sexual assault, as a matter of
law, when she entered the boys' locker

room. As a result, the court confirmed the
importance that the fact-finder decide
issues of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.
On a late October day in 1983, Dawn
Campbell was at her junior high school in
Montgomery County, Maryland. That
day, Dawn was excused from her physical
education class because she had a broken
fmger. While her physical education class
was in session, Dawn wandered onto the
athletic field. According to Dawn, she was
ordered by the boys' physical education
teacher, Steven Rubinstein (Rubinstein),
back into the building because she was disrupting his class. Rubinstein claimed that
he told Dawn and a friend to find their
own physical education class that was also
on the field. Rubinstein said that he watched them begin walking toward their class
and then returned to his own.
Instead of joining her class, Dawn reentered the building and proceeded to the
boys' locker room with Georgia, another
student. Dawn entered the boys' locker
room but evidently Georgia did not follow. At trial, Dawn testified that she had
been in the boys' locker room four other
times in the preceding two months. Each
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time, she did so without permission.
As soon as Dawn entered the locker
room, she heard someone coming. Believing it was a teacher, Dawn hid in an old
shower area which she had discovered on
a prior visit because she did not want to be
found in the locker room. Matt Stoulberg,
a student, however, had followed Dawn
into the old shower area where they began
kissing. When another student, Rudy
Crutchfield, entered the shower area,
Dawn and Matt stopped kissing. Rudy
grabbed Dawn, pulled her onto his lap and
began molesting her. About fifteen boys
arrived while Dawn was screaming and
trying to get away from Rudy. The group
of boys grabbed her and "pulled off her
sweat shirt and brassiere, and sexually
molested her by groping and fondling her
breasts and 'between ... her legs:" Ill. at
58, 533 A.2d at 11. After a few minutes, a
second group of students joined in the
assault. Dawn testified that Clarence
Turner, a part of the second group, said
that he wanted to rape her. This statement
was confirmed by two other students that
were present. When Dawn screamed for
help, several boys covered her mouth and
one student hit her to make her remain
quiet. The entire assault lasted for approximately thirty minutes, ending when the
bell rang.
When Rubinstein entered the boys'
locker room shortly after the bell rang, he
heard a noise from the old shower area. He
yelled for whoever was in the area to get
out. Three to five male students exited the
restricted area and were reprimanded for
being there. Rubinstein did not ask them
why they had been in the old shower area.
He listened for ten to fifteen seconds and
yelled "there better not be anybody else,"
and listened again. Ill. at 59, 533 A.2d at 12.
He testified that he was confident no one
else was in the restricted area. Rubinstein
decided not to enter the area because he
would not have fit through the opening
and was afraid of ripping his shirt. Rubinstein remained in the locker room for five
or six more minutes, until the end of the
period, and did not hear any noise from
the old shower area.
After the bell rang, Dawn gathered her
clothes and left the locker room aided by
two boys. When she returned to the gym,
a substitute teacher, noticing her flustered
appearance, inquired as to the reason. Dis-satisfied with Dawn's answer, the teacher
took her to the principal's office. Dawn
then related the preceding events to the
principal because she was suspended for
entering the boys' locker room.
Subsequendy, Dawn and her mother
sued the Montgomery County Board of
Education (the Board), Rubinstein, and

several students, in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County. Before the case was
submitted to the jury, the trial judge entered judgment in favor of Clarence
Turner. The jury returned verdicts in
favor of Dawn against the Board, Rubinstein and a student; in favor of her mother
against the Board and Rubinstein; and in
favor of mother and daughter against a student for punitive damages. Subsequently,
the trial judge struck the verdicts against
the Board and Rubinstein. The verdict
against the student was allowed to stand.
The first issue addressed by the court of
special appeals was whether there was sufficient evidence of the negligence of either
Rubinstein or the Board to allow the case
to go to a jury. At trial, Dr. Stephens, the
Assistant Principal of Sligo Junior High
School, testified about the standard of care
Rubinstein was held accountable for as a
public school teacher. She testified that
teachers would be expected to at least
glance at all areas of the locker room
where students could be found after a gym
class. Dr. Stephens agreed that gym teachers were responsible for preventing male
students from sexually assaulting female
students. Ill. at 61, 533 A.2d at 13.
Rubinstein confirmed that he knew of
his duty to supervise students in all parts of
the building during his duty hours. These
duties were enumerated in the Policies and
Regulation Handbook for Montgomery
County Public Schools. Ill. at 61-62, 533
A.2d at 13.
To begin its analysis, the court of special
appeals noted that Maryland is very strict
about taking cases from the jury in negligence actions. "The rule has been stated as
requiring submission if there be any evidence, however slight, legally sufficient as
tending to prove negligence, and the
weight and value of such evidence will be
left to the jury." Ill. at 62-63, 533 A.2d at
13-14 (quoting Fowler 'lI. Smith, 240 Md.
240, 246, 213 A.2d 549, 554 (1965». The
court found that the jury could reasonably
have found from the evidence that Rubinstein was negligent in performing his
duties as an agent of the Board. Therefore,
the issue should have been submitted to
the jury. Ill. at 63, 533 A.2d at 14.
Next, the court of special appeals
addressed whether the trial judge was correct in granting a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of
Rubinstein and the Board. Resolution of
this issue was predicated on whether
Dawn was, as a matter of law, contributorily negligent and assumed the risk of a
sexual assault.
The question of whether a plaintiff is
contributorily negligent or assumes a risk
is one for the trier of fact. H either defense

is proven, the plaintiff is barred from
recovery. Ill. at 64, 533 A.2d at 14.
Contributory negligence exists when the
plaintiff fails to act in a way that is consis-tent with his or her knowledge of the
danger that could result from his or her
conduct. A case cannot be taken from the
jury on the grounds of contributory negligence unless there is no possibility that a
reasonable person would find contributory negligence existed. The court of special
appeals found that a reasonable person
could have found that in spite of Dawn's
prior visits to the boys' locker room,
Dawn did not anticipate the danger she
encountered there in October, 1983. Id. at
64-65, 533 A.2d at 14-15.
According to Maryland law, a person
assumes "the risk as a matter of law only
when the undisputed facts permit but one
reasonable determination." Ill. at 65, 533
A.2d at 15 (quoting Hooper 'lI. Mougin, 263
Md. 630, 635, 284 A.2d 236,239 (1971». In
this case, the court decided that there was
no reason for Dawn to expect to be sexually assaulted when she entered the boys'
locker room. Ill.
Since the court held that the trial judge
improperly invaded the discretion of the
jury when he granted the j.n.o.v., they
vacated that judgment and remanded the
case to the Circuit Court for a determination of whether the Md. Educ. Code Ann.
S 4-105 (1985) limitation of $100,000
applies to the judgment against the Board
and Rubinstein. Campbell, 73 Md. App.
54, 66, 533 A.2d 9, 15 (1987).
The court also declared that the trial
judge invaded the jury's fact-finding func-
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tion by .entering a judgment in favor of
one of the students. The general rules
according to which the sufficiency of evidence is tested on appeal are the same for
a directed verdict as for a judgment n.o.v.
Id. at 66-67, 533 A.2d at 15-16.
Through its holding in Campbell, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
effectively restrained a trial judge's
authority, while ensuring that a plaintiff is
not simply subjected to the prejudices of
the trial judge. The defenses of assumption
of the risk and contributory negligence
were preserved as viable options for plaintiffs.

-Stephanie A. Babb
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Cobey v. State: CHROMOSOME
VARIANT ANALYSIS
INADMISSmLE TO MATCH
AllEGED RAPIST TO VICTIM'S
ABORTED FETUS
In a case of first impression, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland in Cobey v.
State, 73 Md. App. 233, 533 A.2d 944
(1987), has held that results acquired by a
technique known as Chromosome Variant
Analysis (C.V A.) cannot be used as evidence to support the possibility that an
alleged rapist fathered the victim's fetus.
On the evening of September 4, 1985, a
woman drove her 1985 blue Subaru automobile to Northwest Branch Park. After
parking her car, she went for a walk on a
trail. While she was walking, the woman
heard someone coming from behind and
stepped aside. A man grabbed her, threw
her off the trail into the woods and
threatened to kill her if she screamed. He
forced her to have oral sex with him, raped
her, and then had anal sex with her, all
against her will. Afterwards, he took the
keys to her car and drove off.
On September 27,1985, Appellant, Kenneth S. Cobey was ordered by the police to
pull over and stop at a traffic observation
checkpoint on Kennedy Street in the District of Columbia. Although Appellant
. had a valid Maryland driver's license he
failed to produce the registration. The
police impounded the car and after issuing
the appellant two traffic tickets they allowed him to leave. Further investigation by a
police auto theft unit revealed that the car
appellant had been driving was the victim's 1985 blue Subaru which had been
taken from Northwest Branch Park 23
days earlier. On September 30, 1985,
Appellant was arrested by Montgomery
County Police.
During the early part of October, 1985,
the victim learned that she was pregnant
and testified at trial in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County that the only
possible source of her pregnancy was the
rape. On October 21, 1985, the victim procured an abortion and with her permission, the police took possession of the
aborted fetus. The fetus and blood samples
from the victim and Appellant were flo"'fn
to Dr. Susan Olson, a cytogeneticist at the
Oregon Health Sciences University. There
she performed a technique known as
Chormosome Variant Analysis (C.V.A.)
to determine whether Appellant might be
the man who fathered the fetus.
Appellant was brought to trial in July of
1986. Although this resulted in a mistrial,
the judge had denied Appellant's motion
to exclude Dr. Olson's testimony before
the mistrial was declared. At Appellant's

second trial, the judge once again declined
to relitigate the issue and permitted Dr.
Olson to testify concerning the results of
the C.V.A. Co~ 73 Md. App. at 236,533
A.2d at 946.
In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d
364 (1978), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted the holding of Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.c. Cir., 1923)
which created the Frye.Reed test. The test
requires that "before a scientific opinion
will be received as evidence at trial, the
basis of that opinion must be shown to be
generally accepted as reliable within the
expert's particular scientific field." Id. at
237,533 A.2d at 946 (quoting Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368
(1978». Appellant contended that C.V.A.
had not been generally accepted as reliable
in the relevant scientific community;
therefore, the testimony derived from the
results of C.V.A. were inadmissible.
Under the Frye-Reed test, the proponent of
a new scientific test bears the burden of
producing evidence to establish the general
acceptance of the technique. Id. at 238, 533
A.2d at 946 (citing Thompson v. Thompson,
285 Md. 488, 497, 404 A.2d 269, 274
(1979». At trial, the court held that the
State had met its burden under the FryeReed test and it was this determination that
was at issue before the appellate court.
In reviewing the trial court's admissibility of evidence established by C.VA., the
court had to resolve two threshold issues:
first, whether the court is bound to consider only evidence in the record which
was before the trial court, and second,
what standard of review should be applied
to the trial court's decision. Although the
court in Reed, did not address the issue of
whether appellate review should be
limited to materials specifically set forth in
the record, the court's holding indicated
that available legal and scientific commentaries could be taken into consideration
even if not part of the record. Id. at 238,
533 A.2d at 947.
In Cobey, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland also concluded that the standard of review applicable to the trial court's
finding of general acceptance is whether
the finding was against the weight of the
evidence as opposed to whether it was
clearly erroneous. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the court of appeals
in Reed conducted its own examination of
the evidence and concluded that spectrography was not generally accepted as reliable, seeming to place no weight on the trial
court's contrary finding. Id. at 239, 533
A.2d at 947.
At trial, the judge held a hearing out of
the jury's presence to determine whether
Dr. Olson would be allowed to testify

-------------------------------------------------------------------1&3ITheLawForum-37

